A prophet serves as a mediator between people and the divine, functioning as a channel through which God communicates important information that cannot be obtained through ordinary means. Philosophers find prophecy intellectually compelling because it raises fundamental questions about divine knowledge, communication, human language, time's nature, and human freedom.

In monotheistic traditions like Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, prophets primarily clarify God's will rather than exclusively predict futures. As William Hasker explains, prophets engage in "witnessing to the people concerning God's purposes and requirements and seeking to recall them to obedience."

When philosophers discuss prophecy, they concentrate on predictions about contingent future events. The core puzzle emerges: if an infallible God reveals that a contingent future event will occur, must that event happen? If it must, how can it remain contingent?

The example from Christian tradition illustrates this tension: Jesus prophesied that Peter would deny him three times before the rooster crowed. If we consider Peter's denial a free act, it qualifies as a future contingent event. Yet, since Jesus cannot be mistaken, how can Peter's later denials remain free?

One philosophical response simply denies the existence of future contingent events despite appearances. Some philosophers embrace this approach because they believe every event has prior sufficient causes. Others contend that free choice does not require genuine contingency or the ability to do otherwise.

"Open theism" offers an alternative: God may not possess knowledge of contingent futures. William Hasker, open theism's most prominent advocate, offers a three-part response to the prophecy problem. First, prophecy's primary function reveals God's will rather than predicting futures. Second, many prophetic predictions rely on existing trends and tendencies. Third, some prophecies simply reveal what God has already decided to accomplish.

William Ockham proposed that truly revealed prophecies about contingent futures "could have been and can be false" even though the prophecy's past existence becomes "ever afterwards necessary." Ockham's insight suggests that if Peter had freely chosen not to deny Jesus, Jesus would never have prophesied Peter's denial.

This approach implies that people possess "counterfactual power over the past"--the ability to perform actions such that if performed, the past would have been different because God would have known and acted differently.

Another approach suggests God exists outside time entirely. God does not foreknow strictly speaking, since foreknowledge means knowing an event at a moment earlier than the event's occurrence. Instead, God knows all events from timeless eternity's perspective.

Luis de Molina developed a view distinguishing three divine knowledge types:

Regarding Jesus' Peter prophecy, Molinists argue God knew through middle knowledge that if Peter faced certain circumstances, he would deny Jesus. God decided to create those circumstances, place Peter within them, and prophecy through Jesus about Peter's actions.

Multiple approaches attempt resolving the prophecy problem arising from future contingent events. Each possesses distinct strengths and weaknesses.